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Abstract: 
 
The aim of the current paper is to study the link between the effects of corporate 
governance on information asymmetry problems and stock liquidity in the Tunisian Stock 
Market. We use a sample of 49 Tunisian firms listed between 1998 and 2007. Our results 
show that corporate governance has direct and indirect effects on stock liquidity. Threat of 
expropriation exerted by family and foreign shareholders discourages reluctant investors, 
which decreases stock liquidity. In contrast, they invest their capital in State controlled firms. 
In fact, State is regarded as an effective controller rather than a shareholder. The State 
involvement in Tunisian firms is considered as state guarantee for investors, which increases 
stock liquidity. Our results provide evidence that some attributes of corporate governance 
improve stock liquidity because they reduce information asymmetry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Literature on market microstructure outlines the importance of stock liquidity in 
financial markets. Handa and Schwartz (1996) argue that: “Investors want three things from 
the markets: liquidity, liquidity and liquidity”. High premium in both developed and emerging 
markets3 are the result of the high risk of illiquidity. The increase of stock liquidity improves 
firm’s reputation in financial markets. Consequently, it increases firm’s value (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 2008) and reduces capital cost (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Finding ways to 
increase stock liquidity has attracted considerable interest of both academics and 
professionals: whether they are regulators or financial analysts. For instance, regulators 
protect minority investors against expropriation risk and encourage their active participation 
in markets, which improves to some extent liquidity (Brockman and Chung, 2003, 2008).  
More recently, Heflin and Shaw (2000), Rubin (2007), Chen et al. (2007), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) and Chung et al. (2010) focused on corporate governance as a 
mean to enhance stock liquidity. They argue that effective control mechanisms, such as 
constraining firms to disclose more information and hiring independent directors reduce 
expropriation risk and increase profitability. In fact, such mechanisms reduce information 
asymmetry problems between majority and minority shareholders, and enhance consequently 
stock liquidity. However, these studies were conducted in developed markets where liquidity 
is high, investors are well protected and ownership is widely dispersed. In emerging markets, 
only some studies address this issue (Mattoussi et al., 2004, Gana and Chemli, 2008; Ben 
Sedrine and Loukil, 2008; Belkhir and Bouri, 2008 and Haddad et al., 2009). They show that 
hese markets display different characteristics: markets are poorly regulated in addition to the 
low market liquidity and the high concentration of ownership. When investors have no state 
guarantees, main agency problems arise between monitory and majority shareholders (Ben 
Ali, 2009).  
Whether they are conducted in developed or emerging markets, to our knowledge, 
these studies have tested effects of one single attribute of corporate governance on stock 
liquidity: ownership structure (Rubin, 2007 and Attig et al. 2006), board of directors 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2007) and voluntary information (Chen et al., 2007 and Haddad et al., 
2009). In addition to the explanation of the link between corporate governance and stock 
liquidity, they argue that corporate governance mechanisms mitigate information asymmetry 
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problems which improve stock liquidity. Thus, corporate governance has indirect effects on 
stock liquidity. 
In the current study, we measure simultaneously the effects of many attributes of corporate 
governance such as the structure of the ultimate ownership and the characteristics of corporate 
board (board independence, weight of the first ultimate owner and the board size), on 
asymmetric information problems and then on liquidity. We raise the following question: does 
corporate governance affect stock liquidity in emerging markets?   
We use a sample of financial and non financial firms which are listed in Tunis Stock 
Exchange (TSE) from 1998 to 2007. Our sample shows the presence of one shareholder who 
is majority. This leads us to analyze how corporate governance can solve agency conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders and what are the effects on stock liquidity.  We 
notice that these firms may be controlled by State, or family or even foreign investors. So we 
test if the corporate governance scheme depends on the shareholder’s identity (in Chinese 
market, it is closely related to this identity, see among others Firth et al., 2007; Chi and Wang, 
2009; Wu et al. 2009).  
In contrast with previous studies which tested only the impact of corporate governance 
on stock liquidity, we distinguish between direct and indirect effects of corporate governance 
on stock liquidity. We focus on the effects of corporate governance on asymmetric 
information and examine then the link between the level of information asymmetry and stock 
liquidity. 
Our empirical findings provide evidence that high ownership concentration and 
separation between cash-flows and voting rights encourage opportunistic behavior of the first 
ultimate owner. In order to get private benefits, he or she relies on his or her private 
information. These results are in line with those of Attig and al. (2006). Moreover, effective 
board of directors (large board and separation between functions of control and management) 
decreases the information asymmetry problems. This reduces informed trading and improves 
stock liquidity. In fact, if uninformed agents suspect the presence of informed agents, they 
trade only when their interests are protected (for example with high risk premium).  This 
increases transaction costs and decreases consequently stock liquidity. At a microeconomic 
level, we join Cai et al. (2006) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), and show that stock liquidity 
decreases with the increase of the percentage of informed agents.   
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 In addition, it seems that the identity of ultimate owner is a proxy of the level of 
expropriation risk. Indeed, Tunisian investors pay more attention to the identity of the 
ultimate owner whatever what they own. State owner is regarded as an effective controller 
who protects their interests against expropriation of majority shareholders, while foreign and 
family investors are more likely to get an opportunistic behavior. Hence, the owner identity 
has a direct effect on investors’ decisions and consequently on stock liquidity.  
  Section 2 presents a survey of the literature on corporate governance and stock 
liquidity and provides hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the methodology. 
Section 4 discusses empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, board 
composition and voluntary disclosure) and liquidity is well covered by the financial 
literature4. The main findings are that high levels of corporate governance reduce information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors which increase stock liquidity. Thus, 
corporate governance has indirect effect on stock liquidity. 
However, uninformed agents prefer investing in firms with high levels of corporate 
governance because it may have direct effect on their stock liquidity (Giannetti and Simonov, 
2006). In the following subsections, we develop conceptual framework that allow us to 
distinguish between direct and indirect effects of corporate governance on stock liquidity.  
 
2.1. Corporate governance, information asymmetry and stock liquidity 
Our paper is related to three strands of the literature on corporate governance and 
stock liquidity.  
The first strand analyzes the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity. 
For instance, Heflin and Shaw (2000) argue that outside investors consider block holders as 
insiders, which increases information asymmetry and decreases stock liquidity. However, 
concentration of voting rights allows dominant shareholder to control firms and enables them 
to enjoy private benefits if expropriation of minority shareholders is possible. Concentration 
of cash-flow rights encourages them to control firms effectively. When shareholder has more 
voting rights than ownership rights, dominant owners don’t care about firm’s objectives: they 
                                                 
4
 See among others Heflin and Shaw (2000), Rubin (2007), Chen et al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et al.(2007) and 
more recently Chung et al. (2010) 
 5
pay more attention to their personal interests (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al. 1999). For 
instance, dominant shareholders can expropriate minority shareholder. In practice, they 
provide funds only if they have private information about projects they would invest in which 
decreases stock liquidity (Attig et al., 2006). Most empirical studies do not provide evidence 
that minority expropriation decreases liquidity in developed markets. Heflin and Shaw (2000) 
report a positive relation between spread and block holder ownership in American firms. 
However in Canadian firms, Attig et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between deviation 
of control from ownership and bid-ask spread.  
The second strand of literature is more recent and analyzes the effect of board 
composition on liquidity (Cai et al. 2006 and Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). It shows that board 
independence reduces asymmetric information and improves consequently liquidity in 
developed markets.  
The current paper is also related to the literature on corporate disclosure.  Voluntary 
disclosure may reduce information asymmetry risk (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). So, high 
level of disclosure improves liquidity and decreases capital cost (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Empirical studies in developed markets provide 
evidence that there is positive relationship between disclosure and liquidity, in contrast with 
studies conducted in emerging markets which have non-conclusive results. Welker (1995) and 
Chen et al. (2007) report a positive relationship between corporate disclosure policy and stock 
liquidity in US markets. Heflin et al. (2005) find evidence that high level of voluntary 
disclosure mitigates information asymmetry problems, which reduces transaction cost. Also, 
Hillegeist and Brown (2007) confirm that high quality of disclosure decreases the percentage 
of trading. Results of Mattoussi et al. (2004) and Haddad et al. (2009) are consistent with 
previous findings in Tunisian and Jordanian markets while Gana and Chemli (2008) report 
that voluntary disclosure decreases stock liquidity. According to the previous findings, 
corporate governance mechanisms reduce information asymmetry problems which have a 
positive effect on liquidity. Hence, we state the following hypothesis:  
H1:  Corporate governance mechanisms have indirect effect on stock liquidity. 
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2.2. Corporate governance, fear of expropriation and stock liquidity 
Protection of investors’ rights and interests encourages small investors, particularly 
who are wealth-constrained and have no business experience (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 
1999 and 2000). However, when shareholder protection is poor, insiders pay considerable 
attention to control rights. It is a mean to expropriate outside investors. In such institutional 
setting, corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of one shareholder. Consequently, 
minority shareholders have no significant decision power (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000).  
When investors are poorly protected, like in emerging markets, corporate governance 
replaces investors’ protection. Indeed, good corporate governance scheme reduces the 
expropriation risk of minority shareholders and protects their financial interests (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). McKinsey's study conducted by Coombes and Watson (2000) provides 
evidence that, in poorly regulated markets, investors pay higher premiums when there is more 
effective governance. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) argue that investors’ choice may be 
driven by fear of expropriation: investors are more reluctant to hold stocks in firms when 
extraction threat of private benefits is more severe. In other words, small investors prefer 
firms which have effective corporate governance. One explanation is that corporate 
governance may substitute for regulation and play more important role when the market is 
poorly regulated and expropriation risk is high. 
Some studies, see among others Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev (2005, 2007) and 
Chen et al. (2009), advance that in emerging markets, investors prefer firms with good 
corporate governance. They noticed that firm’s value increases and equity cost decreases 
when the quality of corporate governance improves. It has more significant effect than in 
developed ones. Accordingly, corporate governance is a credible mean to protect investors. 
Notice that regulatory reform is difficult to do and requires longer time (Klapper and Love, 
2004). Hence, corporate governance helps to build a relationship of trust between insiders and 
outsiders. We advance the following hypothesis:   
H2: A direct mean to enhance stock liquidity is to improve the quality of 
corporate governance. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
We consider a sample of common ordinary stocks of 49 firms listed in TSE between 
1998 and 2007 (see table 1). Daily trading data are provided by TSE and contain closing 
price, trading volume, best ask and best bid. Corporate governance data is collected manually 
from annual reports and “Stock Guide” provided by TSE and Financial Council Market 
(CMF). These data provide information about shareholders and board of directors.  
Table 1. Sample composition 
Stocks by industries  
Banks 10 
Other financial firms 11 
Services 9 
Manufacturing firms 19 
Total 49 
 
3.2. Stock liquidity and information asymmetry proxies 
Microstructure market literature defines many liquidity proxies but, some liquidity proxies, 
such us spread and Amihud ratio, are biased when the sample contains infrequently traded 
stocks (Lesmond, 2005 and Liu, 2006). Accordingly, we use the number of non trading days 
adjusted by turnover as liquidity proxy as in Liu (2006). Notice that Liu measure is also more 
appropriate than average daily spread which does not capture liquidity risk when the 
frequency of non trading days is high. In non trading days the ratio of return to volume cannot 
be calculated. Moreover, Liu proxy is multidimensional in the sense it captures (1) potential 
timing of execution order; 2) quantity of transactions (number, volume); and (3) transaction 
costs. The Liu measure is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading 
volumes. It’s written: 
NoTD
x
Deflator
TURN
NoZVLMx xx
211
×





+=
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where NoZV is the number of no trading days; TURN is the stock turnover; NoTD is the 
number of trading days in the market during the period x, and deflator3 is chosen arbitrary 
such that         
 
Our empirical proxy of information asymmetry is the percentage of informed trading 
AIMO (Aktas et al., 2007), given by: 
( ) ( )QSQBQSQBAIMO +−=  
where QB and QS represent asked and offered quantities respectively.  
 According to Easley et al. (1996), informed traders submit more buy (respectively 
sell) orders when they hold good (respectively bad) signal information. Hence, the difference 
between informed and uninformed trading measures the degree of information asymmetry in 
the market. Hmaied et al. (2006) show that, in Tunisian Stock market, informed traders 
submit more buy orders than uninformed ones. 
3.3. Corporate governance mechanisms 
Ultimate ownership structure 
LaPorta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) outline the difficulty of identifying 
the ultimate controlling shareholders: we must define the threshold of participation to get the 
control. The choice of this threshold depends on legal countries origin. LaPorta et al. (1999) 
find that, in common law countries, firms are widely held firms and 10 % of voting rights is 
enough to control individually a firm, like in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. In 
civil law countries, the threshold is too high because corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated. 
In Tunisia, the ultimate owner should raise 20% of the capital. According to the article 
290 of Commercial Companies Code, shareholders can cancel management decisions when 
they hold at least 20 % of the capital. Omri (2003) defines block holders in Tunisian firms as 
shareholders who own at least 20 % of the capital. 
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We measure control rights (VOTR) and cash-flow rights (CASR) of ultimate owners 
as in La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). To define an ultimate owner let us 
consider the following example: a shareholder Z holds 50% of the capital of firm X, which 
holds 20% of the capital of firm Y. Hence, shareholder Z is the ultimate owner of firm Y 
because he holds 10% (=50%*20%) of cash-flow rights and 20% as control rights (min{50%, 
20%}). Our sample shows the presence of at least two ultimate owners. This is why we 
measure cash-flow rights of the first and the cash flow rights second ultimate owners hereafter 
denoted by CASR1 and CASR2 respectively.  
The difference between the voting rights of the first ultimate (VOTR1) and their cash-
flow rights (CASR1) is an estimation of expropriation risk (Claessens et al., 2002; Attig et 
al., 2006). It is written:  
DIVC= VOTR1 - CASR1 
We are also interested in the identity of the ultimate owner. Many categories of owner 
behave differently, according to their interests and preferences (Pederson and Thomsen, 2000 
and Thomsen and Pederson, 2003). In emerging economies, owner identity is more important 
than ownership concentration (Dyck, 2000; Firth et al. 2007; Omran et al. 2008; Wu et al. 
2009 and Chi and Wang, 2009). We consider dummies proxies to distinguish three owner 
groups: family (CFAM), State (CSTA) and foreign investor (CFOR) such that: 
CFAM= 1  ℎ 	
  	 
 0 ℎ	


 
CSTA= 1  ℎ 	
  	 
 ℎ 0 ℎ	

   
                                                       
CFOR= 1  ℎ 	
  	 
 ℎ 	 
	0 ℎ	


 
Corporate board characteristics   
We focus on three characteristics of corporate board: board independence, weight of 
the first ultimate owner in the board and board size: 
• The board size (BSIZ) is the total number of directors. 
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• To measure the degree of independence, we use, first, the percentage of 
independent directors in the board (INDP). Independent directors are directors 
who have no relationship with the management team (neither financial nor 
personal relationship). 
• In addition, we introduce the separation of control and management functions 
(SPLI) as second proxy of board independence.  
SPLI=1   
	  	   0  ℎ	
                                                                              

 
• We measure the weight of the first ultimate owner in board by the percentage 
of affiliated directors (AFFD). According to Dahya et al. (2008), affiliated 
director are: 1) the ultimate owner; 2) a member of family when the ultimate 
owner is family, 3) an employee of the firm, its subsidiary or employee of 
others firms controlled by ultimate owner, 4) a politician or public servant 
when the ultimate owner is the State; and 5) employee of foreign firm 
domiciled in the same country as the ultimate owner when he is a foreign 
investor. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Sample characteristics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about stock liquidity, information asymmetry 
and corporate governance characteristics. There are 79,4 non trading days on average (Panel 
A) while non trading days exceed 53 days in 50% of our observation. Moreover, the liquidity 
measure is highly dispersed. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Stock liquidity and information asymmetry 
Legend: LM= standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading 
volume; AIMO= absolute value of imbalance order. 
    LM AIMO 
N 385 385 
Mean 79,405 55,945 
Median 53,425 52,558 
Standard deviation 75,913 16,881 
Skewness 0,808 0,683 
Kurtosis -0,739 -0,229 
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Minimum 0 25,158 
Maximum 252 99,998 
 
Panel B. Ownership distribution     
 
 N    Frequency (%)     
Dispersed ownership 19 5,39     
One ultimate owner 287 81,53     
Two ultimate owner 46 13,07     
Ownership and control deviation 79 22,44     
Family  117 33,24     
State  136 38,63     
Foreign   76 21,59     
Institutional  4 1,13     
 
                         Panel C. ownership concentration   
Legend: CASR1= % cash-flow rights of the first ultimate owner; CASR2=% of cash-flow rights of the second ultimate owner; DIVC=the 
divergence between the voting rights and the cash-flow rights; BSIZ= total number of directors; IDEP=% of independents directors; 
AFFD=% of affiliated directors to dominant shareholder; SPLI= 1 if there is a separation between the functions of CEO and chairman and 0 
if not. 
  CASR1 CASR2 DIVC INDP AFFD BSIZ SPLI (%) 
N 352 352 352 352 352 352 23,63 
frequency  - - - - - -   
Mean 0,441 0,02 0,028 0,082 0,547 9,794   
Median 0,457 0 0 0 0,571 10   
Standard deviation 0,213 0,063 0,061 0,133 0,267 1,998   
Skewness 0,009 3,17 2,198 1748 -0,357 -0,701   
Kurtosis -0,069 8,799 4,054 2233 -0,67 -0,356   
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 4   
Maximum 0,992 0,291 0,308 0,556 1 12   
 
We find that, on average, more than half of transactions are initiated by informed 
traders. This means that Tunisian Stock market displays severe asymmetric information. 
In Panel B, statistics indicate that the control threshold 20% is enough to control 
individually firms in 81,53% of firm-year observations. 13% observations show the presence 
of two ultimate owners and a low frequency of divergence between ultimate ownership and 
control of first owner (23,72%).  
Tunisian firms are controlled by three categories of shareholders: State, family or 
foreign investors.  
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Panel C points out that the first ultimate owner has high cash-flow rights (on average 
44%). On average, the proportion of independent directors is low (8%) and well dispersed. 
However, 50% of directors are affiliated with the first ultimate owner. This highlights the 
weight of first ultimate owner. 
In addition, statistics indicate that Tunisian CEOs has usually two functions: chief 
executive director and board chairman in small directors’ board (contains on average ten 
members). 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
According to the first hypothesis, effective corporate governance diminishes 
asymmetric information which should improve stock liquidity. However, according to the 
second hypothesis, the relation between corporate governance and stock liquidity may be 
direct if investors can get an idea about the quality of corporate governance in which they 
would like to invest in. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze, first, the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on asymmetric information. Second, we analyze the link between these effects 
and variation of stock liquidity. 
      4.2.1. Governance mechanisms and information asymmetry in Tunisian listed 
firms 
Hereafter, we use nonlinear principal component analysis (PCA) to examine the relation 
between governance mechanisms and information asymmetry problems. The nonlinear PCA 
does not rely on assumptions like normality and linear relationships among variables in linear 
PCA. Indeed, it is particularly suited when some variables are dummies or when relationships 
between variables are nonlinear.  
In this study, we use non linear PCA because used variables in factor analysis incorporate 
numerical and dummy variables. These variables are closely related to the corporate board 
(four variables), the ultimate ownership structure (six variables) and the private collection of 
information (one variable). Accordingly, we select four factorial axes. The first axis explains 
most of the variance with 22%, while the second and third axes explain 18% and 15% 
respectively of total variance. The last axis captures only 10% of the total variance. 
The following table presents Eigen values and percentages of explained variance. 
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Table 3. Nonlinear principal component analysis 
Panel A. Eigen values and explained variance 
Dimension Eigen value % Explained variance 
1 2,405 21,860 
2 1,945 17,686 
3 1,692 15,382 
4 1,145 10,405 
Total 7,187 65,533 
 
Panel B. Correlations between corporate governance variables, information asymmetry and selected 
axis 
Legend 
CASR1= % cash-flow rights of the first ultimate owner; CASR2=% of cash-flow rights of the second 
ultimate owner; DIVC=the divergence between the voting rights and the cash-flow rights; CFAM= 1 if the 
first ultimate owner is family and 0 if not; CSTA= 1 if the first ultimate owner is State and 0 if not; CFOR= 
1 if the first ultimate owner is foreign investor ; BSIZ= total number of directors; IDEP=% of independents 
directors; AFFD=% of affiliated directors to dominant shareholder; SPLI=  1 if there is a separation between 
the functions of CEO and chairman and 0 if not; AIMO= absolute value of imbalance order.  
 
  Dimensions 
  
                                                     
1 
                     2                      3                     4 
Board 
characteristics 
BSIZ 0,1 -0,426 -0,557 0,041 
SPLI -0,374 -0,126 -0,528 -0,31 
INDP -0,62 0,023 0,162 -0,096 
AFFD 0,623 0,487 -0,182 0,276 
Ultimate 
ownership 
structure 
CASR1 0,156 0,743 -0,424 0,268 
CASR2 -0,384 0,115 0,515 0,484 
DIVC 0,333 -0,417 0,4 -0,351 
CFAM -0,568 0,619 -0,102 -0,357 
CFOR -0,295 -0,561 -0,19 0,623 
CSTA  0,878 -0,005 0,192 -0,116 
Information 
asymmetry 
AIMO                 -
0,134 
                 
0,269 
                 
0,596 
                 
0,056 
 
Axis 1: State controlled firms 
 
The first axis shows significant correlations between two groups of variables. The first 
group contains the presence of the State as the first ultimate owner and the proportion of 
affiliated directors. These variables are positively and highly associated to the axis. The 
second group negatively correlated to the axis and contains the following variables: the 
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presence of family owner as the first ultimate owner and the proportion of independents 
directors. Accordingly, the first axis allows us to distinguish the characteristics of corporate 
governance in State controlled firms. In these firms, corporate board is dominated by 
representatives of the State and is characterized by a low presence of independent directors. 
State ownership may be considered as a substitute for legal investor protection in emerging 
markets (Wu et al., 2009). Hence, the presence of this owner decreases expropriation fear.  
 
Axis 2: Family controlled firms 
We detect a first group of variables related strongly and positively to the second axis. 
This group contains:  (1) cash-flow rights of the first ultimate shareholder; (2) the presence of 
family as a first ultimate owner and (3) the percentage of affiliated directors which captures 
the power of family controller.  
The second group contains two variables: the presence of foreign investors as the first 
ultimate shareholder and the board size. These variables are negatively associated to the 
second axis. Thus, the second axis describes family control which shows highly concentrated 
cash-flow rights, important number of family members in board of directors and a small board 
size. The fact that emerging markets are poorly regulated encourages family owner to extract 
private benefits and to expropriate minority shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Maury, 2006).  
 
Axis 3: Information asymmetry problems   
The third axis is positively related to information asymmetry, cash-flow rights of the 
second ultimate owner and difference between voting and cash-flow rights. In addition, this 
axis is negatively related to cash-flow rights of the first ultimate owner, the separation of 
control and management and board size.  
Therefore, firms characterized by: large separation between control and ownership 
(DIVC) and high cash-flow rights of the second ultimate owner are subject to severe 
problems of asymmetric information which increases informed trading. In contrast, large 
ultimate ownership of the first owner, large board size and separation of control and 
management functions mitigate asymmetric information and decrease consequently 
proportion of informed trading. 
 
Axis 4: Foreign controlled firms  
The fourth axis is related positively and strongly to the presence of foreign investor as 
first ultimate owner and to cash-flow rights of the second ultimate owner. Domestic investors 
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consider firms controlled by foreign investors as foreign firms and they are expecting high 
expropriation risk. This is why they prefer domestic companies (Rhee and Wang, 2009). 
Our results provide strong evidence that there is no correlation between the identity of 
ultimate owner and information asymmetry problems. In addition, we find that some 
mechanisms of corporate governance, such as board size, separation of functions of executive 
and control, cash-flow rights of the first and the second largest shareholder and the deviation 
between control and ownership mitigate information asymmetry. 
These axes enable us to test if corporate governance mechanisms affect indirectly 
liquidity when they diminish asymmetric information or when making decisions depend on 
the identity of the ultimate owner. 
4.3. Impact of Tunisian corporate governance on stock liquidity  
We study the effect of three types of corporate control (State, family and foreign) and 
the effect of information asymmetry problems on stock liquidity. Moreover, we consider the 
following control variables: volatility (VLAT), firm size (SIZE), and book to market ratio 
(BTMK). The model is written now: 
ititititititititit BTMKVLATSIZEAXEAXEAXEAXELM εφφφφφφφφ ++++++++= 76543210 4321  
AXE1, AXE2 and AXE 4 describe corporate governance in firms controlled by State, family 
and foreign owners respectively while AXE3 describes attributes of corporate governance 
when firms are subject to information asymmetry problems. 
 
Table 4. Relationship between corporate governance, information asymmetry and stock liquidity 
 
Legend 
AXE1= State control ; AXE2= family control; AXE3= information 
asymmetry problems ; AXE4= foreign control; BTMK=book-to-market 
ratio; VLAT= stock returns volatility ;  SIZE= firm market capitalization  
ititititititititit BTMKVLATSIZEAXEAXEAXEAXELM εφφφφφφφφ ++++++++= 76543210 4321
 
 
 
AXE1 -22.246 
 (11.73)** 
AXE2 13.987 
 (6.35)** 
AXE3 23.807 
 (11.28)** 
AXE4 24.263 
 (11.85)** 
SIZE -24.628 
 (10.36)** 
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VLAT -10.329 
 (3.06)** 
BTMK 36.505 
 (3.75)** 
Constant 436.228 
 (10.48)** 
Observations 
Firms                                                                   
347 
49 
  *, **: statistically significant at the level of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Results show that the coefficient for State control (AXE1) is negative and significant 
(p < 0.01). It seems that investors are more confident when State is majority shareholder, 
which increases therefore liquidity. We join Ang and Ding (2006) and show that State plays 
an active role in controlling investors in poorly regulated markets like emerging markets. 
These results are consistent with the idea that State shareholder provides real guarantee when 
there is no real legal protection for investors and this improves stock liquidity. 
However, the coefficients for family and foreign control (AXE2 and AXE4) are 
positive and significant (p < 0.01).  These findings indicate that stock liquidity decreases with 
family control. This result shows that Tunisian investors are not willing to invest in family 
controlled firms. This explanation is in line with the argument that expropriation risk is more 
severe in family controlled firms in poorly regulated markets (Faccio et al., 2001 and Maury, 
2006) which discourages investors to trade on stocks of these firms. 
Additionally, foreign control decreases stock liquidity which is consistent with finding 
of  Rhee and Wang (2009). One explanation is that Tunisian investors do not trust the foreign 
controlling shareholders: they are regarded as informed traders who can expropriate their 
wealth. When foreign control increases, Tunisian investors consider firms as foreign ones and 
prefer to trade on stocks of domestic firms. 
These findings are consistent with the corporate governance direct effect hypothesis 
H2.  Hence, Tunisian investors pay considerable attention to the control’s type (family, State 
or Foreign). They prefer investing in firms controlled by State shareholder which leads to high 
levels of stock liquidity in these firms. In contrast, they are reluctant when there the majority 
shareholder is family or foreign investors, which lead to low stock liquidity in these firms. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that corporate governance has direct effects on stock liquidity in 
Tunisian firms. 
Table 4 indicates that the coefficient for information asymmetry (AXE3) is positive 
and significant (p < 0.01). This finding confirms the corporate governance indirect effect 
hypothesis H1. Hence, corporate governance has indirect effect on stock liquidity when it 
mitigates asymmetric information. 
We show that illiquid stocks suffer from high information asymmetry problems. These 
stocks are those of firms characterized by: 1) high ultimate ownership of the second owner; 2) 
large separation between cash-flow and voting rights of the first owner; 3) CEO duality and 4) 
small board of directors. In other words, if low levels of corporate governance increases 
informed trading and leads to low levels of stock liquidity.  
4.4. Robustness analysis 
4.4.1. Other liquidity proxies  
We replace Liu measure by other liquidity measures to test the robustness of previous 
results. The idea is to take into account transaction costs, we use the following proxies:  
• The relative bid ask spread (BASQ), it is written: 
10021
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
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where N is number of trading days in year and prices are in day j.  
• The illiquidity ratio (ILIQ) proposed by Amihud (2002) is written: 
∑
=
=
N
j
jj VolRN
ILIQ
1
1 × 106 , 
where jR is the absolute value of daily return and Volj  × Pj is the daily 
transaction volume in Tunisian Dinars(TND)5.  
• The proportion of days with zero returns (PZER) proposed by Lesmond et al. 
(1999): 
N
returnzeroofnumberPZER =  
To capture quantity dimension, we use turnover ratio (TURN) and quoted depth 
(DEPH) given respectively by: 
                                                 
5
 1TND≈0,69665 USD 
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Where TRAD is trading volume in day j; OUTS are outstanding shares; QAj is the quantity at 
best ask closing day j; and QBj is the quantity at best bid closing day j. 
 
Table 4. Robustness results: Corporate governance and other liquidity proxies 
Legend 
BASQ=The average quoted daily spread; PZER= the proportion of days zero return; ILIQ= the average ratio of a stock absolute daily return 
to its daily dinars volume; DEPH= the average quoted daily depth; TURN= the average daily stock turnover; AXE1= corporate governance 
by State; AXE2= family corporate governance; AXE3= information asymmetry problems; AXE4= foreign corporate governance; 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; VLAT= stock returns volatility; SIZE= firm market capitalization.  
Model: 
 
ititititititititit BTMKVLATSIZEAXEAXEAXEAXEliquidity εφφφφφφφφ ++++++++= 76543210 4321
 
 BASQ ILIQ PZER PROF TURN 
      
AXE1 -0.050 -0.251 -6.961 0.148 0.100 
 (2.47)** (3.28)** (4.72)** (5.36)** (2.13)* 
AXE2 0.056 0.137 1.690 0.020 -0.077 
 (2.36)** (1.69)* (1.09) (0.72) (1.54) 
AXE3 0.135 0.189 2.857 -0.018 -0.220 
 (6.30)** (2.48)** (2.52)** (0.63) (4.38)** 
AXE4 0.152 0.388 0.130 -0.121 -0.477 
 (6.43)** (5.02)** (0.12) (3.85)** (9.55)** 
SIZE -0.319 -0.945 -9.538 0.213 -0.021 
 (13.24)** (10.90)** (8.50)** (7.46)** (0.41) 
VLAT 0.032 0.371 -5.006 0.094 0.266 
 (0.89) (4.66)** (7.61)** (2.70)** (3.21)** 
BTMK 0.229 1.753 6.757 0.695 -1.842 
 (2.18)* (5.23)** (1.69)* (5.38)** (8.28)** 
Constant 6.525 18.517 201.975 2.181 -0.423 
 (15.10)** (11.54)** (9.79)** (4.17)** (0.45) 
Observations 347 344 344 344 347 
N Firms 49 46 46 46 49 
*,**: statistically significant at the level of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 4 shows that only some of previous results are robust, when we use spread and 
price impact as liquidity measures. In fact, some significant effects disappear when we 
consider new liquidity measures: 
First, the State involvement as a shareholder still improves stock liquidity: it reduces 
transaction cost (BASQ, ILIQ and PZER) and enhances both market depth and frequency of 
trading activity. Our results provide strong evidence that Tunisian investors prefer issuing 
equity in State controlled firms because they are expecting low expropriation risk. 
Consequently, they set low transaction costs, which increases trading activity. Second, stocks 
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in family and foreign controlled firms have higher spread and significant impact of order flow 
on stock price. In fact, when Tunisian investors set prices and spread, they are expecting high 
expropriation risk. Third, stocks in foreign controlled firms display low trading volume 
(TURN and PROF). One explanation is that Tunisian investors are suspicious and do not 
invest their money in these firms. Finally, it seems that asymmetric information asymmetry 
increases transaction costs in contrast with frequency of trading activity. In fact, under 
asymmetric information, informed trading and consequently transaction costs increase.  
 
4.3.2. The effect of regulation on the relationship between corporate governance 
and liquidity 
Notice that financial firms operate in a highly regulated environment in contrast with 
nonfinancial firms. Hereafter, we analyze the role of corporate governance in financial and 
nonfinancial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003, Caprio et al. 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 
2008). The aim of regulators is to control managerial and board’s decisions which may 
discourage large shareholders to control financial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003). Hence, 
regulation can be considered as an outside mechanism of corporate governance (Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). To our knowledge, this topic is not well discussed in financial literature 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2008). Some empirical studies find that corporate governance may be 
replaced by regulation (Joskow et al., 1993; Booth et al., 2002; Adams and Ferreira, 2008). 
However, other studies show that in well regulated markets, firms are constrained to set high 
levels of corporate governance (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Booth et al., 2002; Becher and 
Frye, 2010). Hereafter, we analyze the previous effects in financial and non-financial firms. 
First, we divide our sample into two groups: financial and non financial firms and run the 
previous regression in each group (Table 6). These groups are composed as follows: 
Table 5.  Sub-samples composition 
Financial firms Non Financial firms 
 
 
Banks  
Insurance  
Leasing 
Investment company 
10 
2 
6 
3 
Services 
Manufacturing firms 
9 
19 
Total 21 Total 28 
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Table 6. Robustness results: Impact of regulation on the relationship between corporate 
governance and stock liquidity 
Legend 
AXE1= State control ; AXE2= family control; AXE3= information 
asymmetry problems ; AXE4= foreign control; BTMK=book-to-market 
ratio; VLAT= stock returns volatility ;  SIZE= firm market capitalization  
Model : 
ititititititititit BTMKVLATSIZEAXEAXEAXEAXELM εφφφφφφφφ ++++++++= 76543210 4321
 
 LM 
 Non Financial firms Financial firms 
AXE1 -26.279 -18.181 
 (8.75)** (5.07)** 
AXE2 5.254 25.952 
 (0.90) (7.48)** 
AXE3 36.189 10.616 
 (9.64)** (3.44)** 
AXE4 11.170 20.279 
 (2.36)* (8.04)** 
SIZE -12.897 -32.332 
 (3.31)** (9.98)** 
VLAT -13.257 -5.561 
 (3.25)** (2.10)* 
BTMK 55.018 0.861 
 (4.46)** (0.05) 
Constant 207.187 634.121 
 (2.94)** (10.15)** 
Observations 179 167 
Number of firms 28 20 
( ) Absolute value of z statistics 
 * , ** are significant at 5% and 1% respectively 
  
 
Many variables have the same effects discussed above on liquidity in both financial 
firms and in non-financial firms. Even if financial firms operate in highly regulated markets, it 
seems that regulation does not affect the relationship between corporate governance and stock 
liquidity. The State involvement is a signal of effective control which increases stock liquidity 
in both types of firms. In addition, foreign shareholder affects negatively stock liquidity in 
both groups, which confirm that Tunisian investors expect high expropriation risk when the 
controller is foreigner. However, family control has negative effect on stock liquidity in 
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financial firms and negative and no significant effect on stock liquidity in non financial firms. 
Our results show that stock liquidity is negative function of information asymmetry problems 
in financial and non-financial firms. 
5. Conclusion  
Our results show that corporate governance may improve stock liquidity in direct and indirect 
ways because it decreases information asymmetry problems. First, we find that information 
asymmetry depends on some characteristics of corporate governance (except identity of 
dominant shareholder and percentage of affiliated directors). Under asymmetric information, 
investor preferences depend negatively on expropriation risk which is closely related to the 
identity of the dominant shareholder. For instance, Tunisian investors are expecting low 
(respectively high) expropriation risk when the State (family or foreign respectively) is a 
majority shareholder. We provide evidence that some mechanisms of corporate governance 
affect liquidity since they mitigate asymmetric information problems. 
In the current study, we used annual measures of liquidity which is not enough to 
analyze the effects of corporate governance on information asymmetry around announcement 
dates. Indeed, some studies (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, 1994; Chae, 2005) analyzed 
investors’ behavior and asymmetric information problems before and after announcement 
dates. Hence, it is interesting to study the link between corporate governance and stock 
liquidity using event studies. 
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